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Abstract: The central question this paper sought to tackle was “does the quality of institutions mat-
ter for the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic growth?” 
Using macroeconomic data on 27 Sub Saharan African (SSA) economies and six distinct 
measures of governance the fi ndings showed that control of corruption, political stability 
and government effectiveness matter for the infl uence of FDI on economic growth in SSA. 
This key fi nding was found to be robust even in models where these three governance 
indicators were interacted with FDI. Furthermore, the results from threshold-type sample 
splitting showed that in the sample containing countries with a higher level of governance, 
the positive impact of FDI on growth has larger magnitude vis-à-vis the comparator group 
with poorer governance indicators. This signifi cant threshold effects remained robust 
across specifi cations. 
Keywords: Economic growth; Direct foreign investment; Institutional quality; Sub-Saharan Africa
JEL Classifi cation: F23; L13; O16; P20
Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a major source of development fi nance required 
to drive sustained growth in developing countries. In these economies, reliance on 
FDI largely hinges on three considerations. One, the persistent fi nancing gap occa-
sioned by saving-investment divergences; two, the latent benefi ts FDI confers on the 
recipient economy1 and three, the decline in offi cial lending2 and other fi nancial aid 
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to developing countries. As a consequence, there is growing demand for FDI by de-
veloping countries particularly within the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region. 
In spite of the foregoing, divergence of opinions as to the growth impact of FDI 
still exists in the empirical literature. These divergences stem especially from what 
constitutes the main channels through which FDI transmits its impact on growth. 
Unarguably, the absorptive capacity of the recipient country lies at the heart of most 
channel discourses. More interesting though is the diversity of lenses through which 
domestic absorptive capacity has been viewed. These have traversed trade policy ori-
entation (Balasubramanyam et al, 1996), human capital development (Borensztein et 
al, 1998), physical capital accumulation (De Mello, 1997) as well as complimentary 
opinions relating to natural resource endowment, market size, fi nancial sector devel-
opment (can we give some specifi c studies) et cetera. 
The bulk of contemporary emphasis appears to have shifted in favour of the role 
of governance as a mediating link in the FDI-growth nexus. This relatively new fo-
cus has a number of merits. First, good governance seems well suited to higher FDI 
infl ows (World Bank, 2002; Globerman, Shapiro and Tang, 2004). Second, poor 
governance increases the costs associated with uncertainty (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). 
Beyond these, there are interesting emerging views suggesting that poor governance 
is FDI-promoting (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003; Gani, 2007; Staats & Biglaiser, 
2012). On this route also, two recent empirical works by Bellos and Subasat (2012a 
and 2013) lend credence to the assertion that corruption attracts multinational com-
panies (MNCs) to selected transition and Latin American countries respectively, 
rather than dissuading their entry. That said, there remains a dearth of empirical 
investigation on the FDI-governance-growth relationship. 
Thus far and to the best of our knowledge, Pgov (2008) appears to be the only 
study that has contributed to this tripartite relationship for different income groups in 
the developing countries. 
Pgov (2008) examined the impacts of governance in attracting FDI and promoting 
domestic investment and growth performance using low, middle and high income 
groups in that order. Overall his results suggest that governance exerts a signifi cant 
positive impact on both income growth and domestic investment particularly in his 
group of middle income countries. Taken his fi ndings together, he somewhat suggests 
the independence of investment decisions from governance factors. 
The African continent is notorious for her poor governance records and this has 
been opined to have constituted a major stumbling block to growth. This history of 
poor and bad governance is particularly appalling for SSA where dictatorial tenden-
cies and sit-tightism3 syndrome seem more prevalent. Amid these developments, sev-
eral cases of mis-governance remain the common feature of SSA’s socio-economic 
and political landscape. Meanwhile, attracting substantial amounts of FDI hinges on 
good governance which is somewhat a luxury in the SSA region. It is against this 
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background that the study is interested in unraveling the tripartite relationship be-
tween governance and FDI-growth nexus for SSA. 
The paper’s motivation stems from the following standpoints: fi rst, since SSA is 
noted for her poor record as far as governance is concerned, examining the extent to 
which governance mediates in the FDI-growth linkage becomes pertinent. Second, 
in spite of the phenomenal increase in world FDI infl ows to the developing countries, 
the SSA region’s share persistently remains meager4. Is this connected to the level 
of institutional quality in SSA? Answering this question is another thrust of this pa-
per. Third, and most importantly, we craft a role for potential non-linearities in this 
tripartite relationship.  No study, as far as we are aware, has attempted this thresh-
old-type analysis for SSA. These are the key contributions of the present paper to the 
FDI-growth-governance literature in SSA. 
Beyond this introductory discussion the rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 contains the literature review on governance, foreign direct investment and 
economic growth. Model, data and econometric issues are dealt with in Section 3. 
The presentation and discussion of empirical results is in section 4, while the conclu-
sions of the study appear in Section 5.  
Literature Review
In this section, we do not attempt to duplicate the vast literature on the impact of FDI 
on growth but present a general discourse on the strand that crafts a role for gover-
nance in the FDI-growth space.    
Examining the impact of FDI on economic growth5 has attracted considerable 
research interests among economists, policy makers and researchers alike. In spite 
of this spurt in research efforts, the issue on FDI-growth nexus is largely contentious 
and somewhat inconclusive. The crux of the ensuing contention however, centres on 
the channels through which FDI impacts on growth. The core of this view is that 
spill-over effects of FDI on growth are conditional on additional factors within the 
FDI-receiving economy. This aligns with the positions of Balasubramanyam, et al 
(1996), Borensztein, et al (1998) and Carkovic and Levine (2003) that observed that 
FDI effects on growth are not necessarily positive. Thus, the initial level of devel-
opment, existing stock of human capital, well developed fi nancial markets and trade 
policy regime were suggested as factors that predispose the host country to reaping 
the growth related benefi ts of FDI
More recently, emphasis has been shifted to the role of institutions in attracting 
FDI into a country. The forerunner in this regard is Dunning (2002). He argued that 
institutional factors such as good governance and economic freedom have become 
increasingly important determinants of FDI since the motives of multinational com-
74 Kazeem Ajide, Oluwatosin Adeniyi and Ibrahim Raheem
panies (MNCs) have shifted from market- and resource-seeking to effi ciency-seek-
ing. By implication, traditional determinants of FDI such as natural resources, low 
labour costs and good infrastructure are now becoming relatively less important 
while less traditional determinants such as governance and economic freedom have 
gained ascendancy (Loree and Guisinger, 1995; Noorbakhsh, Paloni and Youssef, 
2001; Addison and Heshmati, 2003; Becchetti and Hasan, 2004). Though, Dunning 
blazed the trail in this respect, the strand of literature that specifi cally crafts a role 
for governance in FDI-growth nexus is still budding. However, Pgov’s (2008) study is 
an important exception. The study examined the impacts of governance in attracting 
foreign direct investment and promoting domestic investment and growth perfor-
mance using three income groupings for countries: low, middle and high respective-
ly. Applying intra group regression method, he found that governance is positively 
correlated with per capita income growth rate in the middle and high income groups 
while no correlation was found in the low income group. Also, he established a pos-
itive relationship governance and total investment (domestic investment plus FDI) in 
low income countries but not with FDI infl ow ratio. However, in the middle income 
countries, despite variations among governance elements, governance is generally 
found to have more infl uence on FDI infl ow than on domestic investment. Finally, 
in high income countries, governance shows very limited impact on both domestic 
investment and FDI, suggesting the independence of investment decisions from gov-
ernance factors. 
In a somewhat similar study Raheem and Oyinlola (2013) used Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and Threshold Auto Regressive (TAR) models to examine the impact 
of FDI and governance on growth for seven ECOWAS countries over the period 
spanning 1996 to 2010.  They found that FDI and governance are positively related 
to growth in the linear regression (OLS). For the non-linear model (TAR), the result 
showed that the positive effect(s) of FDI would begin to manifest once governance 
reaches a threshold level of -1.2. They equally reported the signifi cance of sound 
macroeconomic policies in conditioning the direct benefi ts of FDI
Summarily, the obvious scarcity of empirical studies on the tripartite relationship 
gives a clear indication of the gap fi lled by the present study. These are briskly reiter-
ated for ease of appreciation. First, the FDI-growth-governance linkage is examined 
with specifi c reference to a group of SSA countries. To the best of our knowledge, 
empirical works on this tripartite relationship are scarcely available unique to this 
regional grouping. Second, the presence of non-linearities is probed via the inclusion 
of interaction terms. Third, both aggregate and disaggregated components of gov-
ernance are employed for eventual model estimation with a view to enabling clear 
policy suggestions. Finally, sample splitting on the basis of all six indicators of gov-
ernance to refl ect the infl uence of potential non-linearities is yet another signifi cant 
novelty that the present paper brings into the FDI-governance-growth debate in SSA.
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Model and Data
Coming on the heels of prior arguments, in this paper, on the FDI-growth linkage 
via governance




 is real per capita GDP, CAP
it
 is the gross fi xed capital forma-
tion expressed as a percentage of GDP, FDI
it
 proxies for foreign direct investment, 
GOV
it




 is the interaction term between the 
latter two variables. In the same vein, CONTROLS
it
 in line with the literature on 
growth regressions covers conditioning factors such as infl ation (INF), offi cial ex-
change rate (EXR) and a measure of trade openness (OPEN). 
In equation (1) above,  GOV
it
 is the composite index for governance. This is fur-
ther decomposed into its six components thus: 
                                                                              (2)
Control of Corruption (CC) captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of cor-
ruption, as well as “capture” of the state by the elite and private interests. Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence (PS) measures the perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism. Government Effectiveness (GE) 
captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy for-
mulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to such policies. Regulatory Quality (RQ) captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development. Rule of Law (RL) captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confi dence in and abide by the rules of society, and 
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Voice and Accountability 
(VA) captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and a free media. The composite index of governance (GOV) will be 
obtained using principal component analysis (PCA), an approach we tersely detail 
subsequently. 
Annual data spanning the period 2002-2010 was used in the study. All data were 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2012 and World 
 GROWTHit = f (CAPit ,GOVit , FDIit ,GOV * FDIit ,CONTROLSIt )
 GOVit = (CCit ,GEit .PSit , RQit , RLit ,VAIt ){ }
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Governance Indicators (WGI) provided by the World Bank on the governance quality 
of countries (Kaufmann et al., 2012 ). 
Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. Summarily, it shows that the mean values 
for FDI and economic growth are 3.5% and 4.1% respectively, while the interactive 
term between the two variables carries the value of 28.5. All the governance indica-
tors have negative values with political stability carrying the highest value of -0.183, 
followed by regulatory quality and control of corruption respectively.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev.
CAP 20.180 19.900 46.815 -1.401 7.399
INF 7.878 5.964 108.879 -3.100 11.033
FDI 3.592 2.273 25.112 -4.618 3.978
PGDP 4.128 6.0962 27.158 4.823 3.987
FDI*PGDP 28.542 15.506 340.516 -30.729 46.285
EXR 4.652 5.560 7.685 -0.232 2.151
OPEN 22.290 15.937 16.980 4.670 25.142
CC -0.395 -0.476 1.250 -1.439 0.542
GE -0.480 -0.524 0.727 -1.605 0.480
PS -0.183 -0.042 1.186 -2.305 0.742
RL -0.440 -0.437 0.668 -1.606 0.492
RQ -0.397 1.438 0.791 -1.487 0.409
VA -0.357 -0.286 0.932 -1.476 0.640
Source: Authors’ Computation with underlining data from World Development Indicator (2012) and World Govern-
ance Indicator (2012)
Table 2 presents the estimated results of baseline regression equation. It shows a 
positive association in the FDI-growth nexus. This relationship is positive and sig-
nifi cant across all board. This relationship can b said to be stable in all our regres-
sion. Hence, the study lends support to the argument that FDI leads to growth as it 
provides the much needed capital for investment, increases competition in the host 
country industries, and aids local fi rms to become more productive by adopting more 
effi cient technology or by investing in human and/or physical capital (Raheem and 
Oyinlola, 2013; Asiedu, 2004).
For governance indices, it is only control of corruption, political stability and gov-
ernment effectiveness that serve as ingredient to economic growth. Although insig-
nifi cant, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability retard the eco-
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nomic growth process of the FDI recipient’s country. This shows that these measures 
of governance are weak and thus, inhibits growth. On the main objective of the study, 
the interactive term between FDI infl ow and growth supports the result stated above, 
i.e. when FDI is interacted with the indices of governance, it produces a positive and 
signifi cant coeffi cient with the exception of rule of law and voice and accountability. 
The study also found out that private investment in the form of Gross Fixed Cap-
ital Formation is helpful in propelling economic growth rate of the recipient coun-
tries. In most cases, this positive relationship is signifi cant. It is expected that depre-
ciation of domestic currencies against American Dollar would lead to expansion of 
export volumes, which would later translate to economic growth in the long run. Our 
results support this intuition. Current account balance has been helpful in economic 
growth process of SSA countries. The exact effect of infl ationary pressure on growth 
is uncertain, as it produces mixed results.
Two robustness tests were conducted that relates to sample splitting. First, the 
countries under investigation are divided into two groups. Countries whose gover-
nance indices are greater than or equal to the mean values are grouped together, 
while countries whose indices are lower than the mean values are equally grouped 
together. The second test is the use of an exogenous approach to sample splitting is 
the adoption of Threshold Auto Regression which was proposed by Hansen (2000). It 
involves regressing equation 1with different values for the proxies of fi nancial devel-
opment. The threshold value is obtained with the value that produces the highest Sum 
of Square Residual and the least R2. The conventional classical test such as t-statistics 
is not valid to test for the level of signifi cance. This is due to the reasoning that TAR 
technique is non linear. Rather, the level of signifi cance can be determined through 
likelihood ratio test (confi dence interval). 
The results of the robustness tests are presented in Tables 3 and 4. In our fi rst test, 
we found that growth is higher in countries with high developed level of control of 
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and regulatory quality. The 
result of the TAR model indicates that the threshold values of the governance indices 
are quite similar to the mean value. Above the mean values of governance indices, 
there would be increase in economic growth via FDI and vice versa. Hence, for FDI 
to impact positively on growth, level of governance must be developed to the value 
of the mean.  
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Table 2: Panel regression results for interaction models





















































































R2 0.74 0.82 0.84 0.69 0.79 0.81
DW 1.96 1.85 1.79 1.85 2.01 1.93
No of Obs 224 224 224 224 224 224
Source: Authors’ Computation with underlining data from World Development Indicator (2012) and World Govern-
ance Indicator (2012)
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Conclusion
The study examines the inter-relationship between governance and FDI-growth nex-
us. Using dataset for 27 countries in SSA namely Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,  Chad, Congo, Cote d’ 
Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mo-
zambique, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and 
Zambia. The results obtained showed that control of corruption, political stability 
and government effective matter for growth. But the same cannot be said of other 
governance indices. This same result was produced with the inclusion of regulatory 
quality when indices of governance were alternatively interacted with FDI. These 
results are robust to the threshold analysis and sample splitting technique employed. 
The robustness tests show that countries with governance level that is higher than or 
equal to the mean value records higher positive impact of FDI infl ows on growth and 
vice-versa. One limitation of the study is its inability to explain why improved regu-
latory quality, voice and accountability and rule and law did not increase the positive 
effect of the infl ow of FDI on economic growth in SSA. Future studies might centre 
attention on unpacking this empirical puzzle.
NOTES
1 These include benefi ts such as productivity gains, transfers of new technology, the introduction of 
new processes, management techniques, and technical know-how in the local market, employee train-
ing and international production networks and employment generation.
2 Offi cial lending to SSA region has declined substantially as a share of GNP from 6% in 1990 to 3.8% 
in 1998 while foreign aid per capita declined from an average of $35 over 1989-92 to about $28 over 
1993-97 (World Bank,2000b). In addition, remittances were reduced by 8.3% in 2009 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Bank, 2009).
3 This term is coined to refl ect the cursory statistic which clearly shows that as of 2011, twenty one 
African leaders had stayed in offi ce for periods ranging from 11 years to 42 years. Also, an appreciable 
number of the lot transitioned from being military dictators into civilian rulers. This tendency, put 
together, is what we have termed sit-tightism.    
4 Africa’s fl ow of FDI is still less than 3% of global FDI infl ows, the African share in global infl ows 
fell from 3.1% to 2.7% and 2.9% in 2005 and 2007 respectively. Specifi cally, over 1980-89 and 1990-
98, FDI to SSA grew by 59%. This compares with an increase of 5200% for Europe and Central Asia, 
942% for East Asia and Pacifi c, 740% for South Asia, 455% for Latin America and Caribbean, and 
672% for all developing countries (World Bank, 2000a).
5 See Buckley et al., (2002); De Mello (1997, 1999) and Borensztein et al (1998) for excellent surveys 
of the literature on the effect of foreign direct investment on growth.  
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